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ABSTRACT
Simple agent based exchange models are a commonplace in the study of wealth distribution in an
artificial economy. Generally, in a system that is composed of many agents characterized by their
wealth and risk-aversion factor, two agents are selected sequentially and randomly to exchange wealth,
allowing for its redistribution. Here we analyze how the effect of a social protection policy, which
favors agents of lower wealth during the exchange, influences stability and some relevant economic
indicators of the system. On the other hand, we study how periods of interruption of these policies
produce, in the short and long term, changes in the system. In most cases, a steady state is reached,
but with varying relaxation times. We conclude that regulations may improve economic mobility
and reduce inequality. Moreover, our results indicate that the removal of social protection entails a
high cost associated with the hysteresis of the distribution of wealth. Economic inequalities increase
during a period without social protection, but also they remain high for an even longer time and, in
some extreme cases, inequality may be irreversible, indicating that the withdrawal of social protection
yields a high cost associated with the hysteresis of the distribution of wealth.
1 Introduction
Empirical studies of the distribution of wealth of people, companies and countries were first presented, more than
a century ago, by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. He asserted that in different European countries and times the
distribution of wealth follows a power law behavior, i.e. the cumulative probability P (w) of agents whose wealth is
at least w is given by P (w) ∝ w−α [1]. Today, that power law distribution is known as Pareto distribution, and the
exponent α is named Pareto index. However, recent data indicates that, even though Pareto distribution provides a good
fit to the distribution of high range of wealth, it does not agree with observed data over the middle and low range of
wealth. For instance, data from Sweden and France [2], India [3], USA [4], and UK [5] are fitted by a log-normal or
Gibbs distribution with a maximum in the middle range plus a power law for high wealth range. The existence of these
two regimes may be justified in a qualitative way by stating that in the low and middle class the process of accumulation
of wealth is additive, causing a Gaussian-like distribution, while in the high class the wealth grows in a multiplicative
way, generating the power law tail [6].
Different models of capital exchange among economic agents have been proposed trying to explain these empirical data.
Most of these models (for a review, see [7]) consider an ensemble of interacting economic agents where two of them are
sequentially and randomly chosen to exchange a fixed or random amount of wealth. Aiming to obtain distributions with
power law tails, several methods have been proposed to introduce a multiplicative factor in the exchanges. Keeping the
constraint of wealth conservation, a well known proposition is that each agent saves a fraction – constant or random – of
their resources [8–14]. With this proposition in mind, each agent i is characterized by a wealth wi and a risk-aversion
factor βi.
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Let assume an exchange of wealth between agents i and j. Supposing that i wins an amount of wealth from j, we have
that
w∗i = wi + dw ; w
∗
j = wj − dw,
where w∗i(j) is the wealth of the agent i(j) after the exchange. In this article we work with two rules that determine
the quantity dw transferred from the loser to the winner: the fair and the loser rule [15, 16]. The first one states that
dw = min[(1− βi)wi(t); (1− βj)wj(t)], while in the second we have dw = (1− βj)wj . The first rule is called fair
because the amount of wealth exchanged is the same regardless of who wins, so the richer agent accepts to risk part of
its wealth [15]. On the other hand, in the loser rule, the richer agent puts a higher amount at stake, thus, the exchange is
only likely in situations where agents do not know the wealth of the others [8].
Numerical [8, 13, 16] and analytical [17] results of some variations of fair rule indicate that one possible result of that
model is condensation, i.e. concentration of all available wealth in just one or a few agents. To overcome this situation,
different rules of interaction have been applied, for example increasing the probability of favoring the poorer agent in a
transaction [13, 14], or introducing a cut-off that avoids interactions between agents below and above this cut-off [18].
Here we choose the former approach, using a rule suggested by Scafetta [14, 16, 19], where, in the exchange between
the agents i and j, the probability of favoring the poorer partner is given by:
p =
1
2
+ f × |wi(t)− wj(t)|
wi(t) + wj(t)
, (1)
and f is a factor that we call social protection factor, which goes from 0 (equal probability for both agents) to 1/2
(highest probability of favoring the poorer agent). In each interaction the poorer agent has probability p of earn a
quantity dw, whereas the richer one has probability 1 − p. It is evident that the higher the difference of wealth, the
higher the influence of f in the probability; thus, f is a good indicator of the degree of application of social policies of
income distribution. In what follows we compare the results for the two rules in terms of the indicators of inequality
and economic mobility. It is important to know weather the results are stable or not; for this reason, we define an
equilibration criteria for the system. Besides, due to the fact that the probability asymmetry is intended to model a
public regulation to protect the poore agents, it is reasonable to assume the f is not constant in time. Thus, we analyze
the effects that periods of interruption of these policies may have, in the short and long term.
All the simulations here presented have been performed for systems of N = 1000 agents and results have been averaged
over 1000 samples. Initial conditions are that both wealth (wi) and risk-aversion factor (βi), are uniformly distributed
in the [0, 1] interval. We use here the MCS (acronym of Monte Carlo Step) as the unit of time, defined as the minimum
number of steps needed for all agents to be able to be selected (i.e., N/2), and the system evolves for a time T , multiple
of that value and long enough to verify equilibrium.
2 Time evolution with a constant social protection factor
2.1 Inequality
The Gini index is a measure of the inequality of a distribution and is often used to measure wealth inequality by
economists and statistical organizations. It is defined as the ratio of the area enclosed by the Lorenz curve of the
distribution (or cumulative distribution function) and the area under the uniform distribution [20]. In an operational way
we define the Gini index as [21]:
G(t) =
1
2
∑
i,j |wi(t)− wj(t)|
N
∑
i wi
.
Gini index varies between 0, which corresponds to perfect equality (i.e. everyone has the same wealth), and 1, that
corresponds to perfect inequality (i.e. one person has all the wealth, while everyone else has zero wealth). Here we will
use the Gini index to measure the degree of inequality, but also, as a dispersion measure, to determine the stability of
the wealth distribution.
Keeping this idea in mind, we show in Fig. 1 the time evolution of the Gini index, where we observe that generally it
converges to a fixed value, after a transient of less than 50× 103MCS. For both rules, the higher the value of f , the
smaller the inequality, as expected. Also, we show in Fig. 2 the average Gini index over the last 104MCS as a function
of f , for both rules (error bars 3 are smaller than the size of scatter plot). The fair rule leads to a greater inequality
3Let be A the last n = 104MCS of Gini index time series. The square of the error of E[A] is given by [22]: δ2A =
σ2A
n
(1+2τA),
where σ2A = E[A2]−E[A]2 is the variance ofA and τA =
∫∞
0
φA(t)dt is the autocorrelation time, where φA(t) = E[A(0)A(t)]−E[A]
2
σ2
A
is the stationary autocorrelation function.
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distribution in comparison to the loser rule, when f < 0.3. For f > 0.3, the opposite scenario is found; however the
differences in Gini index on the right side of the crossing point are less significant than on the low f region.
0 25 50 75 100
t (103 MCS)
0.6
0.8
1
G
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t (103 MCS)
0.5
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f =  0.0
f =  0.1
f =  0.2
f =  0.3
f =  0.4
f =  0.5
Figure 1: Time evolution of Gini index for different values of f , with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. The system
arrives very fast to equilibrium for the fair rule, while it takes a little longer for the loser rule. Notice that for f = 0 the
system arrives to condensation in the case of the fair rule, while it never condenses for the loser rule.
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f
0.4
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fair
Figure 2: Average of Gini index as a function of f , for the two rules: fair and loser. Fair rule leads to higher inequality
(and even condensation) for low values of the social protection factor, but to lower inequality when f > 0.3.
As complementary information, we show in Fig. 3 plots of the equilibrium wealth distribution, H(w), for some selected
values of f . H(w) represents the fraction of agents that have wealth between w and w + dw. We can see that there is
an almost uniform region for the very low-wealth class, for both rules, if f / 0.3. As for the high-wealth class, while
the loser rule shows a power law tail with an f -dependent exponent (Fig. 3-right), the fair rule shows an exponential
tail (Fig. 3-left and Fig. 4), except for f = 0, when a power law tail is observed.
Comparing the two rules, we notice that with f < 0.3, the Gini index from them diverge more (Fig. 2), with the fair
rule showing bigger inequalities. Such can be apparently contradictory with the distribution of Fig. 3 where as we said
there is an exponential tail in those cases, usually associated with lower inequalities than power law tail. However the
bigger inequalities comes form the low-income region where for the fair rule an apparent tendency to condensation is
observed as f → 0.
2.2 Economic Mobility
Keeping the constraint of wealth conservation, economic mobility is only possible through exchanges. Due to this
fact, a good indicator of mobility is the average wealth exchanged per unit time (MCS), called the liquidity of the
system [23], being defined as
L(t) =
1
2N
∑
i
|wi(t)− wi(t− 1)|.
We show in Fig. 5 the time evolution of the liquidity, where we can observe that, for both rules, the mobility increases
with the increasing of value of f . Comparatively, the system with fair rule has less economic mobility. This is due to
the restriction of this rule itself: only the minimum of the two risked wealth is exchanged, unlike the other rule, where
the amount exchanged can be the full stake. Furthermore, as we show in Fig. 6, in the case of the fair rule a significant
3
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Figure 3: Equilibrium wealth distribution averaged over 104MCS for different values of f , with fair (left) and loser
(right) rule. Notice that for f = 0.3 the distribution is different for the two rules, although having the same Gini index.
0 20 40 60 80 100
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Figure 4: Equilibrium wealth distribution for the fair rule and for three different values of f . Distributions are the result
of averages over 104MCS and presented in semi-log scale. Notice that the distributions have a exponential tail.
fraction of agents (that decreases with increasing f ) have zero wealth 4; thus, whenever they are selected no wealth is
exchanged, causing a lower mobility. It is interesting to observe that in the case of the loser rule the liquidity is never
zero, keeping the economy at work.
0 25 50 75 100
t (103 MCS)
0
0.05
0.1
L
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f =  0.5
Figure 5: Time evolution of liquidity for different values of f , with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. Liquidity may go to
zero in the case of the it fair rule.
2.3 Path to equilibrium
Similar results are found in a previous work [16], where the same system evolves for 104MCS. Moreover, it was
shown in that work that for some low values of f the stabilization was not complete, and a slow dynamics was still
4The global wealth in 2014 was less than 1015 USD [24], while in our artificial system the total wealth is 500. Since USD unit is
discretized by the minimum value of 0.01 USD, by analogy we set the minimum unit as 10−15. Therefore, we consider the wealth of
an agent i equal to zero if wi < 10−15.
4
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Figure 6: Fraction of agents with zero wealth for different values of f , with fair rule.
present. This can be explained now due to the lowest liquidity, showed in Fig. 5. Here, systems evolve for periods ten
times longer; therefore, it is worth to verify the stabilization of the system after this longer time. To do so, we use the
time series of the Gini index: the system will be said to be equilibrated when a measure that depend on two times ( t
and t+ τ ) is invariant under a temporal translation, that is, when it only depends on the interval τ , and not on the time t
itself.
With this picture in mind, the system will be said to be equilibrated when the time series Gt = {G(t) · · · , G(T )} is
second order stationary, that is, when R(t, τ) = R(τ) for all t , being R(t, τ) = E[(Gt − E[Gt])(Gt+τ − E[Gt+τ ])]
the autocovariance function [25]. In an operational way, we divide the Gini index time series into (T −M) time series
of length M : {G(t) · · · , G(t+M)}; so, the autocovariance function is estimated as
R(t, τ) ≈ 1
M
M∑
n=1
[G(n+ t)− 〈G〉t][G(n+ t+ τ)− 〈G〉t+τ ] , 〈G〉t = 1
M
M∑
n=1
G(n+ t).
This equilibrium condition implies that, for all t, ∂R∂t = 0. The distance from equilibrium for a given time series Gt can
be given by the mean square error (MSE) of this derivative over all associated values of τ , that is,
MSE(t) =
〈(
∂R
∂t
)2〉
τ
≈ 1
M
M∑
τ=0
(
R(t+ 1, τ)−R(t− 1, τ)
2
)2
.
Working with M = 25 × 103MCS, we show in Fig. 7 the time evolution of this mean square error, where we can
observe that, for both rules, the system arrives to an stable state.
0 20 40 60
t (103 MCS)
10 18
10 15
10 12
10 9
MSE
0 20 40 60
t (103 MCS)
10 18
10 15
10 12
10 9
f = 0.0
f = 0.1
f = 0.2
f = 0.3
f = 0.4
f = 0.5
Figure 7: Mean square error (MSE) for different values of f , with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. MSE is very small
(10−9) even for short times and arrives to extremely low values for t of the order of 40× 103 MCS.
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3 Perturbation of the social protection factor
In the previous section, we studied the effect of a constant social protection policy, i.e. a constant value of f . This factor
summarize the set of regulation measures to protect the low income sector of the population. However, this kind of
policies are subjected to political changes and so a constant value of f is rather artificial. In this section, we analyze
the consequences —in the short and the long term— of changes in social protection during a perturbation period.
Particularly, we will focus on a common pratice nowadays, a reduction or elimination of social protection. To do so, we
use the following approach: with the system initially equilibrated at f = 0.5, the value of f is changed suddenly to
f = 0.5−∆fp and kept in this value during tp steps, where ∆fp is called the intensity of the perturbation. After this
perturbation period, the value of f returns to its initial value f = 0.5, as schematically shown in Fig. 8.
0 tp
0.4
G(0)
G( )
G(tp)
1
f = 0.5 f = 0.5f=
0.
5
f p
G(t)
t
equilibrium transient after perturbation
perturbation period
Figure 8: Schematic description of the perturbation procedure, exemplified for the fair rule, with tp = 6× 103MCS
and ∆fp = 0.4.
A first measure of the short term impact is the difference in the Gini index between states before and immediately after
the perturbation, that is, ∆Gp = G(tp)−G(0). It is shown on Fig. 9 that, for both rules, the greater the value of ∆fp,
the greater that difference, as expected. Due to the slower relaxation of loser rule, as shown in Fig. 7, that difference
increases a little when increasing the perturbation time. Reciprocally, in the fair rule, that difference is almost constant
in terms of perturbation time.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Gp
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
tp =  2 
tp =  4 
tp =  6 
tp =  8 
tp =  10 
×103 MCS
Figure 9: Difference in the Gini index between states before and immediately after the perturbation, for different values
of ∆fp and tp, with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. Changes in the Gini indexes are almost independent of the duration
of the perturbation, and bigger for the it fair rule. Notice that the vertical axis are different for the two rules.
After the perturbation, the time series of Gini index has a stretched (or compressed, as we will see below) exponential
relaxation:
G(t ≥ tp) = G∞ +A exp
[
−
(
t− tp
τ
)α]
,
6
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where G∞ is the equilibrium Gini index after perturbation, τ is a characteristic relaxation time and α is a positive
exponent. This exponent is called stretching exponent if it is lower than 1, and compressing exponent if it is greater
than 1. Such functional form indicates that, after the perturbation period, a new equilibrium state is attained. This fact,
however, does not guarantee that the Gini index of the new equilibrium state is equal to the initial, pre perturbation Gini
index; in other words, the perturbation may be irreversible. We define ∆Girr = G∞ −G0 the difference between the
original and the final gini indexes, that measures, if different from zero, the irreversibility of the Gini index after the
perturbation process.
We show on Fig. 10 the cases in which ∆Girr = G∞ −G0 is within the margin of error (explained in the previous
section). For the loser rule, it is verified that the final state is statistically equivalent to the initial one, in all cases; for
the fair rule the same occurs for ∆fp = 0.1. In the other cases, the opposite is perceived: the difference is outside the
margin of error and, so, the system is irreversible. The interruption of social protection in this particular rule, therefore,
generates greater inequality in any future scenario, which is all the greater the longer the time and the intensity of the
perturbation. Technically, the result is easily understood: after the pertubation the wealth of a significant fraction of the
agents is nullify and, in a similar way as it was shown in Fig. 6, they can not get out of this situation, independent of
any further change of f .
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
0
1Girr
×10 1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
6
4
2
0
2
4
6 ×10
4
tp =  2 
tp =  4 
tp =  6 
tp =  8 
tp =  10 
×103 MCS
Figure 10: Difference in the Gini index between equilibrium states before and after the perturbation, for different values
of ∆fp and tp, with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. Note the differences in the two scales. The colored area represents
the error bar.
In order to deeper inspect the irreversible situations, we show in Fig. 11 the distribution functions H(w) for the fair
rule, after perturbations applied for tp = 6× 103MCS. Clearly, the irreversibility of the Gini index is associated with
the decreasing density of the middle-wealth class and the correspondent increase in the lower-wealth region. This
happens if ∆fp > 0.1 and the effect is more dramatic the greater the perturbation. The shift of agents from the middle
class to the lower class is something similar to what is obtained with a different process [19], where agents do not
interact if their wealth are apart in more than a certain gap. Nonetheless, here, the result comes from the irreversibility
caused by the temporary suspension of a protection policy. If, however, ∆fp . 0.1, the wealth distributions return to
the pre-perturbation distributions. Similar results are obtained for other values of tp and are not represented here.
For the loser rule, the post-perturbation equilibrium wealth distributions are equivalent to the pre-perturbation one in all
cases, as expected because of the reversibility of the Gini index, so we do not show them.
3.1 Transient behavior
We have shown that the system arrives to an equilibrium state in all situations studied. However, the behavior of the
transient between the perturbation and the new equilibrium depends, for each of the studied rules, on the intensity
and duration of the perturbation. That takes us to the problem of finding or defining an adequate relaxation time.
Nonetheless, for the systems studied here, a practical interpretation of the parameters τ and α makes sense only from a
mathematical point of view, as showed in the Appendix A. In a real system, a slow relaxation may maintain a lower
inequality than a faster one, if the first perturbation has a lower ∆Gp. So, it is important to define a characteristic time
that takes this into consideration. With this objective in mind, we define a factor 1−X that is the relation between
G(t)−G∞ and G∞, that is:
G(tX)−G∞ = (1−X)G∞ ⇒ tX = τ
[
log
(
A
(1−X)G∞
)]1/α
This means that definying a value ofX , for example 0.9 we obtain a characteristic time tX for which the Gini coefficient
is 10% higher than the equilibrium Gini value G∞. In Fig.12 and in order to study the system very near equilibrium,
7
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Figure 11: Post-perturbation wealth distributions for the fair rule. H(w) are the equilibrium distribution after different
perturbations ∆fp applied during tp = 6 × 103MCS. All of them averaged over 104MCS. Note the reference
distribution of the initial pre-perturbation equilibrium wealth distribution with f = 0.5.
we use X = 99%. It is possible to observe that the grater the pertubation time and the value ∆fp, the grater the
characteristic time, i.e. the time to arrive to equilibrium. In relation to the perturbation time, as it is shown in Fig.13, the
lower the pertubation time and the greater the value of ∆fp, the greater the relation
t99%
tP
. Comparatively, the fair rule
relaxation is faster in almost all cases.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
0
2
4
6
t99%
×103
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5 ×10
4
tp =  2
tp =  4
tp =  6
tp =  8
tp =  10
×103 MCS
Figure 12: Characteristic relaxation time for different values of ∆fp and tp, with fair (left) and loser (right) rule. Notice
the multiplicative factor for the vertical axis are different for the two rules
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
0.0
0.2
0.4
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0.8
1.0
t99%
tp
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
fp
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0 tp =  2
tp =  4
tp =  6
tp =  8
tp =  10
×103 MCS
Figure 13: Characteristic relaxation time and perturbation time ratio for different values of ∆fp and tp, with fair (left)
and loser (right) rule.
4 Conclusions
We have presented here a detailed study of the approach to equilibrium in a system of interacting agents, where two of
them are sequentially and randomly chosen to exchange an amount of wealth according to two rules, called fair and
8
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loser rule. The first rule states that the exchanged quantity is the minimum of the two risked wealths; the second one
states that this quantity is equal to the wealth risked by the loser agent. One important factor in the exchange is the
factor f in Eq. 1 that allows to improve the chances of winning for the poorer agent in each exchange, being this factor
an enhancement factor of the difference of wealth between the two agents. The factor f represents then a regulation, or
social protection mechanism. This kind of protection may change according to the political situation of a country. Thus,
we have also investigated the effect of changes, or simply suppression of this social protection, and how much time the
system needs to return to the original situation when social protection is restored, even if in some situations it does not
return at all.
We have demonstrated that, for both rules, systems with a constant f always arrive to an stable or equilibrium state.
More important, we have verified that a strong and constant social protection policy induce an active redistribution
of wealth and this result in a positive influence in the economy, increasing liquidity, trade, exchanges and economic
mobility, and reducing inequality. The loser rule, even if looking "unfair", helps to reduce inequality in all situations,
with the eventual exceptions of a social protection factor bigger than 0.3.
Remarkable, our results clearly show that the interruption of social protection entails a high cost associated with the
hysteresis of the distribution of wealth. For both rules, the longer the perturbation period and the greater the perturbation
intensity, the greater the inequality induced in the short-term. In the middle and long term, the consequences are
reciprocal for the two rules. Regarding the perturbation times, the fair rule presents a fast relaxation, but the inequality is
irreversible in most cases, in such a way that the greater the perturbation time and intensity, the greater the irreversibility.
In the case of the loser rule, all cases are reversible, but accompanied by a slower relaxation.
These results are valid for different initial conditions providing that no finite fraction of agents have zero wealth. Also,
the values of the risk aversion are constant all along the simulations. Different rules and a change in time of the risk
aversion, as exemplified in, are subject of future work.
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A Technical questions about Perturbation
In fact, the systems equilibrate in all situations studied. However, such says little about the behavior of the transient
between the perturbation and the new equilibrium state. A first general measure about that behavior is the average
relaxation time, given by [26, 27]:
〈τ〉 =
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−
(
t
τ
)α]
dt =
τ
α
Γ
(
1
α
)
,
where Γ(x) is the Gamma function. We show on Fig. 14 that, with the exception of ∆fp = 0.5, the loser rule relaxation
is slower than the fair rule one. Generally, for both rules, the longer the pertubation time, the slower the relaxation. The
influence of the intensity of perturbation, however, is different for the two rules. For the fair rule, there is a non trivial
behavior: the relaxation is very fast with fp ≥ 0.2, and, in the other cases, the greater the value of ∆fp, the slower the
relaxation. For the loser rule, on the other hand, the slower the value of ∆fp, the slower the relaxation, in all cases.
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Figure 14: Average relaxation time for different values of fp and tp, with fair (left) and loser (right) rule.
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In comparison with the exponential exp(−t/〈τ〉), the short and long term regimes in the transient may be understood
with two reciprocal behavior [27]: one such that relaxation is faster and one such that the relaxation is slower. Here
we focus on the short-term relaxation, where the long-term one is implicit, since it has the reciprocal behavior. In the
stretching case (α < 1), the lower the value of α, the faster the relaxation on short times. This can be observed in Fig.
15, where, for the loser rule, the greater the perturbation time and the intensity of perturbation, the slower the relaxation
on short times. Also, this can be a good approximation for the fair rule, in most cases with ∆fp ≤ 0.4. Analogously, in
the compressing case (α > 1), the higher the value of α, the slower the relaxation on short times. This is the case for
the fair rule with ∆fp = 0.5 and in some cases with ∆fp = 0.4, where the first one have a faster relaxation on short
times than the second one.
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Figure 15: Stretching / compressing exponent for different values of fpert, with fair (left) and loser (right) rule.
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